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After Katrina:


Building New Orleans Back Better Than Ever


Introduction



Policy Recommendations

 

(Source: State of the Parish Year Ending 2005 )

Like it or not, New Orleans is closer to the Gulf of Mexico than it used to be. We must rebuild the natural defenses that nature gave us and take advantage of those created by man that may have been overlooked.


Beginning a Comeback






Affordable Housing

This pilot involves the development of modular, permanent housing on a site that is currently being used for temporary housing. It serves two purposes, the first of which is to identify transitional housing sites that may be appropriate for permanent affordable housing. Given that money is being spent to lay infrastructure in these transitional sites, it seems wasteful to just remove it when the transitional housing is no longer needed. Along these lines, the pilot would be used to help identify appropriate criteria for identifying candidate sites and develop processes for making the transition from temporary to permanent housing, with set-asides for affordable housing. The other purpose of the pilot would be to show how modular housing technologies can be used to develop affordable, attractive, and efficient housing.

New modular and panelized housing technologies can be used to create homes that are attractive, safe, and affordable. To leverage these potential advantages, cities and parishes should consider reviewing their building codes to make sure these technologies are permissible within their jurisdictions. It also may be appropriate to reduce permitting and inspection fees for such housing, since the burden on inspectors should be substantially less. Note that this may present an opportunity for economic development, since modular housing factories could be created in any community that requires significant levels of rebuilding. Cities and parishes should be responsible for this action. State level entities or nonprofit organizations concerned with affordable and efficient housing, may be able to provide assistance with sample code structures that serve this end.

 

 



Implementation should occur in the near term, ideally within three to six months, such that developers can consider modular housing among the possible options as they begin to rebuild. This recommendation will result in small administrative costs on the part of cities and parishes as they take time to research and update their codes.

Existing mortgage programs will serve some, but not all, residents. Insurance settlements can be held pending FEMA resolutions, which have taken as long as 36 months in past disasters, and SBA programs may not cover the full replacement or repair costs. Consequently, it will be important to develop programs which address population segments with known difficulties in recovering their pre-Katrina housing situation: elderly homeowners that experienced severe loss, homeowners with mortgages whose settlements and current income do not leave them with enough resources to rebuild without filing bankruptcy, and individuals whose credit is too poor to allow them to qualify for SBA funding.

Many low-income homeowners are likely to be uninsured or underinsured, while renters generally have limited cash for down payments. In addition, borrowers will face difficulty meeting traditional mortgage criteria due to hurricane-related issues such as unsettled insurance claims on existing mortgages or late payments due to income disruption. Even people with strong credit may lose their homes due to the inability simultaneously to pay for an existing mortgage on a damaged property, for temporary housing, and for rebuilding costs to either replace or repair damaged property. The flooding caused by the hurricanes in non-flood zones, where flood insurance was almost nonexistent, has only exacerbated problems. Non-predatory mortgage products with flexible underwriting features, which take into account a borrower’s pre-hurricane credit history and factor in other effects of the disaster, will be needed to ensure that low-income individuals and families participate in the long-term recovery of their communities. These products could be used by those facing mortgage defaults or foreclosure, or by those who have no other means to purchase a home.

For this recommendation, we need to establish a mortgage program that works with local banks, mortgage companies and brokers. The mortgage products provide flexibility for residents displaced by Katrina. As additional flexibility is needed, the state along with other housing agencies should work together to suggest changes to the secondary markets. If necessary, the state may offer to act as an additional guarantor for such mortgages. This recommendation should be implemented within 6 to 12 months to assist residents as they transition from temporary to permanent housing. There is very little cost associated with this proposal, primarily administrative costs on the part of lending institutions. The most important factor is the willingness of mortgage brokers to revisit their risk analysis accounting procedures to consider extenuating circumstances in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

Using FEMA payments combined with HUD rental vouchers and other subsidy funds, Hurricane Katrina has provided an opportunity for Section 8 voucher holders to become homeowners. Steps should be taken by local housing authorities, acting in concert with “New Statewide Community Development Entity,” to explain the process of qualifying for a mortgage loan to their voucher holders. Those who qualify would be able to purchase a home with minimal down payment and in many cases could own a home for the same monthly cost as their rental payment.

Though employers do not have legal responsibility to assist their employees with affordable housing options, in many circumstances it may be in their best interest to do so. This is especially true for post-Katrina New Orleans, where lack of affordable housing may severely curtail the available labor pool as businesses attempt to rebuild. Per this recommendation, the state should (a) help educate businesses on the advantages of providing financial assistance to support affordable housing, and (b) create the appropriate institutional mechanisms to funnel corporate housing assistance in the most efficient manner.

This recommendation involves the use of public and private funds to create nonprofit community land trusts (CLTs) that would maintain land for affordable housing. A CLT is a nonprofit entity that would own the land but not the buildings on the land. Individual residents own the buildings, have a long-term lease on the land, and act as members of the trust. The compelling advantage for CLTs is to ensure that even if surrounding land values rise, homes within the trust will remain affordable. This can be achieved, for example, by structuring the charter of the CLT such that the appreciation of individual home values cannot exceed the rate of inflation. Possible mechanisms for assembling CLTs would include land purchases, transferable development rights, land swaps, or eminent domain. The Commission makes a similar recommendation in the section on Land Use. Local governments would work with housing advocacy groups to set up nonprofit community land trust entities. If necessary, the state could provide enabling legislation to govern various facets of the CLT institutional structure. This recommendation should be pursued in three to six months such that development decisions and land assembly activities can commence. Assembling land trusts will be relatively costly. Likely funding sources include federal agencies such as HUD, the state, local governments, NGOs, developers, and local businesses interested in assisting with housing for their low-income work force.

Fannie Mae currently offers energy-efficient mortgages under one program, and location-efficient mortgages under a separate trial program. Location-efficient mortgages are based on the idea that if one lives within a walkable neighborhood, or close to transit, then one does not necessarily need a car and can afford to spend a higher portion of income on housing. We request that Fannie Mae combine these mortgage programs, along with a housing durability component, into a single housing efficiency mortgage product. Based on reducing the overall lifecycle cost of a home, this program could be designated as an experimental Katrina Recovery Mortgage. If a home is built to enhanced standards of durability, energy efficiency, water efficiency, and location efficiency, then homeowners would qualify for this product. Additionally, in contrast to Fannie Mae’s existing products, this program should qualify homeowners for a lower interest rate, as opposed to a larger loan.

As insurance companies take stock of their operations in New Orleans, they should be encouraged to reduce their risk premiums for housing that exceeds basic water and wind safety codes. To the extent that additional safety measures reduce the risk of damage in the case of severe weather events, those savings should be passed along to homeowners. This, too, should help make housing more affordable and create greater incentives for developers to exceed basic codes. The federal flood insurance program already includes reductions for basic safety features, but perhaps the insurance premium reductions should be even larger to provide more incentives for additional safety strategies.

With location- and resource-efficient housing, local governments over time will spend less on utilities and infrastructure such as roads or sewer lines. For this reason, they should be able to offer reduced property taxes on unites that are located in high-density mixed-use neighborhoods, are located near transit, or use energy and water at high levels of efficiency. Unfortunately, with the existing loss of the property tax base, there is no reasonable way for local governments to offer such tax breaks at the present time. On the other hand, as rebuilding occurs and the local tax bases are restored, it should be possible to offer future tax breaks, perhaps after 2008. Local governments should offer lower property tax rates after 2008 for all homes that reduce their needs for infrastructure.

The state and/or federal government also should consider directly subsidizing housing improvements designed to make affordable homes even more affordable by reducing energy and water expenses, maintenance costs, and transportation costs. The government could pay the difference in the cost for homes that are built to higher standards, for example, or offer no-interest loans for the upgraded portion of the housing price. Federal agencies such as HUD, EPA, or DOE and/or state agencies would need to establish this program within six months so that they could influence building design decisions as they are made. The costs likely would be high, and would be borne by federal or state agencies responsible for the programs.

Because the number of housing units that need to be rebuilt over a short time span far exceeds the prior level of construction efforts within the city, it will be necessary to create an improved capacity for building code officials in New Orleans. Possible responses include the creation of a “lend an official” program over the short term along with securing funding to hire and train new officials over the longer term. These steps may require efforts on the part of the state as well as local governments. Federal agencies such as HUD or FEMA, as well as CDBG funds, may provide funding assistance, while the National Institute of Standards and Technology is a likely source for technical assistance.

These efforts should be ramped up within three to six months so as to keep pace with rebuilding requirements. It will require a moderate level of funding. Considering the decimated state of local government budgets, state or federal agencies appear to be the most likely source of needed funds.

To ensure planning issues associated with housing, transportation and other infrastructure are considered jointly, the Governor’s Commission advocates the creation of a regional planning authority spanning the parishes most affected by Katrina. This could be formed in one of two ways. First, the existing Regional Planning Commission (RPC) could be expanded to include housing and other infrastructure in addition to transportation and to cover all parishes. Second, a new regional planning authority could be created and subsume the current role of RPC. The planning agency would be created by the state, working in concert with the city and parish governments in the affected area. While this recommendation is not as urgent as others, it should be addressed within 12 to 18 months. The state must determine the long-term source of funding for the organization. Possible sources include federal funds, state funds, or specially earmarked local sales taxes.

 

Disaster Planning

Conclusion

 

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